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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1175 
PATENT LAW-REISSUE PATENTS-APPLICATION OF PUBLIC USE AND SALE 
BAR: SECTION 102(B)-Patentee applied for an original patent, defining a 
shelving unit; the patent was issued twenty-two months subsequent to the 
date of application. Less than two months later, application for a reissue 
patent was filed, describing and claiming a change in the dimensions of 
a given surface from "greater than one-half' to "greater than one-third" 
the height of a prescribed standard. The reissue patent was awarded eight 
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months after the application for reissue. Patentee subsequently assigned 
the reissue to plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff brought suit for infringement, 
and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the re-
issue was invalid because the claimed subject matter had been on sale and 
in public use more than one year prior to the filing of the reissue applica-
tion.1 The district court denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en bane, held, affirmed. The 
Patent Act of 1952 expressly provides that a broadened reissue patent may 
be applied for within two years of the grant of the original patent.2 The 
one-year public use bar was inapplicable in this case; therefore, the reissue 
in question could not be judged invalid as a matter of law. Union Asbestos 
& Rubber Co. v. Paltier Corp., 298 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 
865 (1962). 
A reissue patent is a new and amended letter of patent, granted be-
cause the original is inoperative or invalid. The invalidity may be due 
to a defective specification or drawing, or because the patentee, without 
deceptive intent, claimed more or less than he had a right to claim. Also, 
it is clear that no new material may be introduced into the reissue appli-
cation. 3 The law of reissue patents, as reflected in successive judicial deci-
sions and statutory changes, has undergone rather distinct stages of growth. 
First, reflected in the early nineteenth century are the concerns of an 
expanding society. In 1832, the Supreme Court, in Grant v. Raymond,4 
upheld the validity of a reissue patent granted by Secretary of State Clay 
four years after issuance of a defective original. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, 
seeking to establish a theoretical basis for the concept of reissue patent, 
quoted from the patent clause of the Constitution: "to promote the prog-
ress of science and useful arts." The patent was to serve both as a reward 
and stimulus to individual exertion in building the new nation. If error 
were to occur, "All would admit, that a new patent, correcting the error 
... ought to be issued."5 There was no need to elaborate on time limits 
and none were expressly provided; the reissue was to be considered as 
appended to the original and to run from the same date. "That sense of 
justice and of right which all feel"6 would provide the necessary standard 
for decision. Patent statutes enacted in 18327 and 18368 codified the Grant 
v. Raymond holding. Some fifty years later, a new stage of development 
1 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1958). "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ••• 
(b) the invention was • • • in public use or on sale in this country, more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . •• " 
2 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1958). "No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope 
of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant 
of the original patent." 
3 35 u.s.c. § 251 (1958). 
4 31 U.S, (6 Pet.) 141 (1832). 
5 Id. at 156. 
6 Id. at 157. 
7 Patent Act of 1832, ch. 162, § 3, 4 Stat. 559. 
s Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 13, 5 Stat. 117. 
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had begun. The frontier fields of inventive activity were being individually 
appropriated, and the seemingly endless opportunities for industrial ex-
ploitation were becoming more limited. Thus, by 1881, the Court, in Miller 
v. Brass Co.,9 was concerned that "the evils which have grown from the 
practice [of permitting expanded reissues to issue indiscriminately] have 
assumed large proportions."10 Therefore, a patent reissued more than 
fifteen years after an original grant was held void. The "evils" to be 
avoided were clear to the Court: through the buying up and later broad-
ening of narrow patents, areas of opportunity were being closed to thou-
sands of inventors and manufacturers. But the reissue device itself was 
not challenged, since it was felt that abuses could be prevented by setting 
time limits on reissue applications. The problem thus resolved itself into 
one of defining a time standard. Having no prior standard to serve as a 
guide, the Court proceeded by analogy. Two types of analogy were em-
ployed in formulating a permissible period for reissue application. First, 
the Court considered the equitable doctrine of !aches. But laches was not 
sufficiently precise, and a more certain measure was thought to be neces-
sary. Secondly, the Court turned to the then recently enacted Patent Act 
of l 870, which prescribed a two-year public use bar to grants of original 
patents.11 Since that statute provided that public use of a patentable 
invention for a period of two years resulted in loss of opportunity to 
obtain patent protection by the inventor, the same two-year period might 
be employed to determine when an inventor's rights to the broadened 
subject matter of a narrowly claimed patent should likewise be lost.12 
During the decade following Miller, a series of cases was decided in 
which the Court, while repeatedly reaffirming the right to a broadened 
reissue, evolved a two-year limit on permissible delay between the original 
grant and the reissue application.13 This judicial limitation persisted, 
with little or no change, for over half a century. Then, in 1939, the Patent 
Act was amended, reducing the public use limit on original patents to 
one year.14 This new one-year rule was applied by the Court of Customs 
o 10! U.S. 350 (1881). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198. 
12 "If two years' public enjoyment of an invention with the consent and allowance 
of the inventor is evidence of abandonment, and a bar to application for a patent, a 
public disclaimer in the patent itself should be construed equally favorably to the 
public." Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881). An alternative ground for the 
Miller v. Brass Co. holding was that there was in fact no mistake. 
13 Toplilf v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156 (1891); Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96 (1885); 
Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354 (1884). The Court in Topliff stated, "That due dili· 
gence must be exercised in discovering the mistake in the original patent, and that, 
if it be sought for the purpose of enlarging the claim, the lapse of two years, will ordi· 
narily, though not always, be treated as evidence of an abandonment of the new matter 
to the public to the same extent that a failure by the inventor to apply for a patent 
within two years from the public use or sale of his invention is regarded by the statute 
as conclusive evidence of an abandonment of the patent to the public." 145 U.S. at 
170-71. 
14 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, as amended, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 
1212 (1939). 
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and Patent Appeals to reissues as well;15 but the Supreme Court has not 
as yet ruled on the effect of the statutory change. In Sontag Chain Stores 
Co. v. National Nut Co.,16 its latest decision involving reissue time limits, 
the Court omitted any reference to the 1939 amendment and merely re-
affirmed the two-year bar.17 The Patent Act of 1952, regarded as a codi-
fication of existing case law,18 has preserved the dual time formulas. Sec-
tion 102(b) states, as a condition of patentability, a one-year limit on 
public use and sale.19 Section 251 provides for application for broadened 
reissue within two years after the original grant.20 Thus, while the Court 
in Miller v. Brass Co. had postulated a two-year limit between original 
patent and reissue on an analogy to the two-year public use bar of original 
patents, by 1952 the Patent Act had explicitly set up different time limits. 
Within the past three years, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit has handed down two crucial decisions, apparently initiating a new 
phase of development. In 1960 Crane Packing Co. v. Spitfire Tool & Mach. 
Co.21 was decided. In an opinion written by Judge Castle, the court 
stated that a reissue application which seeks to broaden the original claim 
is subject to both time limits: the application must be filed within two 
years of the original grant and the broadened subject matter must not 
have been in public use or on sale for more than one year.22 Then, in 
1961, the same court, this time speaking through Judge Duffy, seemingly 
held, by implication, that a reissue application which does not broaden the 
original claim, but rather is concerned with correcting defects in the orig-
inal specifications, is subject to neither time limit.23 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit first imposed the one-year public use bar on broadened reissue 
claims; then, in the following year, re-emphasized that only broadened 
claims are to be barred by one year of public use. In the principal case, 
the court sitting en bane refused to hold invalid, as a matter of law, a 
reissue patent claiming subject matter in public use more than one year 
15 See, e.g., In re Dufault, 41 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 971, 214 F.2d 181 (1954); In re Hayes, 
37 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 806, 178 F.2d 940 (1949); In re Croskey, 35 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 864, 
165 F.2d 797 (1948). 
16 310 U.S. 281 (1940). 
17 "Recapture within two years of what a patentee dedicates to the public through 
omission is permissible, under specified condition ..•• " Id. at 293. 
18 See S. REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1956). 
19 See note 1 supra. 
20 See note 2 supra. 
21 276 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1960). 
22 Id. at 274. 
23 England v. Deere &: Co., 284 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1961) (original patent issued 
April 22, 1952; device sold to defendant June 3, 1953; plaintiff filed application for 
reissue Sept. 23, 1954; court held reissue patent valid). Cf. principal case at 53-54, where 
Judge Castle in his concurring opinion stated: "The two year limitation for applications 
is expressly confined to applications for enlargement of the scope of claims. And all 
invention defined by the original claims is protected by the original patent and it is 
only a reissue application for broadened or enlarged scope of claims and consequent 
preemption of additonal subject matter w~i~ must fall before the interdict of § l02(b). 
And Spitfire stands for no more than this. 
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prior to application. Judge Duffy, for the majority, based the decision 
on the explicit language of section 251 of the Patent Act.24 Judge Castle, 
in his separate concurring opinion, vigorously took exception, arguing that 
the reissue section of the act expressly incorporates by reference a one-year 
public use and sale bar, as an added restriction on broadened reissue pat-
ents.25 He based his concurrence on the further ground that this reissue did 
not constitute a broadening of the scope of the original claim. So unresolved, 
denial of summary judgment below was affirmed, and the case remanded 
for trial on the merits.26 
At issue here are considerations which go beyond a question of statu-
tory interpretation, i.e., whether or not the opening clause of section 25127 
incorporates by reference the one-year public use bar of section 102(b). 
The problem is basic to the function of the reissue concept in the Ameri-
can patent system. A 1956 Senate report disclosed the following facts: 
sixty percent of all patents now go to corporations (seventeen percent to 
corporations owning assets of fifty million dollars or more); during the 
period 1947-1954 sixty percent of patents litigated before United States 
courts of appeals were invalidated; in 1954 the average length of time be-
tween application and grant of patent was over three and one-half years, 
with in excess of 220,000 applications pending.28 The report concluded 
that the individual "garret" inventor has been gradually losing out to the 
large corporate laboratory.29 Yet, the contribution of the "garret" inventor 
is of crucial importance to the scientific and technological progress of the 
American community, and his position must be safeguarded by the patent 
system.30 Some of the problems facing the individual inventor are: (I) 
financing the research he must undertake; (2) the cost of obtaining patents 
and marketing his inventions; (3) the high mortality rate of patents; (4) 
the delay and red tape in obtaining patents.31 Were the Spitfire rule-that 
the one-year public use bar applies to broadened reissue patents-to be up-
held, the position of the individual inventor would be further undermined. 
As a consequence of the delay by the Patent Office in processing his ap-
plication for an original patent, usually in excess of one year, the prospec-
24 See note 2 supra. 
25 Judge Castle contends that paragraph 3 of § 251 ("The provisions of this title 
relating to applications for patent shall be applicable to applications for reissue of 
a patent • . • .'') incorporates by reference § 102(b). 
26 Two recent cases are in accord with the majority opinion in the principal case. 
Ex parte Strassburger, 127 U.S.P.Q. 417 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1960), refused to follow 
Spitfire if the decision meant that any reissue patent more than one year after the 
date of the original patent was barred. See also Hartzell Indus., Inc. v. McCauley 
Industrial Corp., 304 F.2d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 1962). 
27 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1958): "The provisions of this title relating to applications for 
patent shall be applicable to applications for reissue of a patent •••• " 
28 S, REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4, 6 (1956). 
20 In 1955, there were 4,835 laboratories in operation in this country; in 1950, there 
were 3,313 scientific laboratories employing 165,032 persons. Id. at 1-2 8: n.l. 
so Id. at 2. 
31 Id. at 2 n.5. 
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tive patentee faces a serious dilemma. Should he maintain the secrecy 
of his invention until the original patent has actually issued, so as to be 
sure that the claims are fully and correctly described and reissue is not 
required? Or should he make his invention public at once and risk the 
possibility that the one-year bar will fall before he can apply for reissue? 
The "garret" inventor, possessing limited financial resources and frequently 
operating on borrowed capital, may have to meet interest and repayment 
schedules. The resulting pressure to realize a return on his investment, 
made more severe because of a possible three and one-half year wait in 
obtaining his patent, might well force such an inventor to premature 
public disclosure. Should the one-year public use bar become decisive, the 
possibility of reissue would thus be lost. The added restriction to reissue 
validity would also expose the independent inventor to increased likelihood 
that his patent rights will be infringed, resulting in greater litigation 
burdens and higher probability of invalidation by the courts. As a con-
sequence, the property interest of the inventor in his invention would be 
made more tenuous, and financing of his research more difficult to obtain.82 
Moreover, additional restrictions on reissues would result in a reaction 
of secrecy and suspicion; a condition labeled a "disease" by an eminent 
scientist and statesman;33 an obstacle to the constitutional purpose of 
"promoting the progress of science and public arts"; a threat to the ad-
vance of a modem technological society. There is need for a new look 
at reissue patents as a legal concept.34 Three-quarters of a century ago the 
Court, seeking to eliminate the evils it then saw, postulated an analogy 
between original and reissue patents.35 Once crystallized, this analogy be-
came an unquestioned premise in deciding later cases. Now, the court in 
the principal case must re-examine, in terms of the modem problems of 
patent law, whether original and reissue patents are actually equivalent, 
whether they serve the same purpose, and whether the same interests are 
at stake. A subsequent decision in this litigation, now remanded for trial 
on the merits, may help to clarify this troubled area of patent law. 
Robert V. Seymour 
32 Id. at 4-5. 
38 Dr. Vannevar Bush, in Some Proposals for Improving the Patent System, 39 J. PAT. 
OFF. Soc'Y 11, 22 (1957). 
34 See S. REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 15 (1956). 
35 Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 (1881). 
